![]() Would the shah’s regime fall? Would protest be suppressed, or peter out? Iranians polled friends and strangers ceaselessly to find answers to these questions, yet the answers careened unpredictably. As protest mounted against the shah, Iranians had no idea what was going to happen. In particular, we discover an atmosphere of overwhelming confusion. The more we learn about the details of the revolution, the more evidence we find that resists existing explanations. These theories lead us to expect sullen quiescence in the face of the monarchy’s armed forces, or scattered protest in light of the radicals’ lack of resources, or various other scenarios. According to social-scientific explanations for revolution, it shouldn’t have happened when it did, or at all. The Iranian Revolution is deviant in an academic sense as well. ![]() By comparison, less than 2 percent of the population participated in the French Revolution, and less than 1 percent participated in the overthrow of Soviet communism. Indeed, the Iranian Revolution was one of the most popular upheavals in world history: viii Preface 10 percent or more of the Iranian population participated in the demonstrations and general strike that toppled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. ![]() It imposed the first Islamic republic in recent times, and it remains the only instance of a mass Islamic revolt. Although I have shed some of my ignorance, I still see the Iranian Revolution as a “deviant” case. Since that time I have studied the Persian language, visited Iran, and met and worked with untold numbers of Iranians. Continued reference to “the Ayatollah” in the West was a sign of ignorance or hostility. In 1978, during the revolution, he came to be referred to as “Imam,” a unique title that set him apart from other high-ranking ShiÐi Muslim religious scholars. As I started to learn about Iranian history, I realized how misguided our reference to “the Ayatollah” had been, given that there are many ayatollahs, and that Ruhollah Khomeini-our target-no longer carried this title in Iran. I was quite embarrassed when a teacher later pointed this out to me. They probably did not realize-I know we didn’t-that the mosque was Saudi affiliated, that almost all Saudis and Iranians were of different sects within Islam (Sunni and ShiÐi), and that the Islamic governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran were mutually hostile. In rush-hour traffic outside a mosque, we waved placards that read, “Honk if you hate the Ayatollah.” Lots of drivers honked. I remember participating in an anti-Iran rally with some of my high school classmates. A quarter-century has passed, and I still recall my outrage. DS318.8.K87 2004 955.05′42-dc22 2003056907 Designed by Gwen Nefsky Frankfeldt Contents Preface vii 1 Introduction 2 The Emergence of Protest: Political Explanations 1977 3 Mobilization of the Mosque Network: Organizational Explanations Early 1978 1 12 33 4 ShiÐi Appeals: Cultural Explanations Mid-1978 50 5 General Strike: Economic Explanations Fall 1978 77 6 Failure of the Fist: Military Explanations Winter 1978–1979 105 7 A Viable Movement: Anti-Explanation Winter 1978–1979 125 8 Conclusion 163 About the Sources 175 Notes 187 References 239 Acknowledgments 281 Index 283 Preface Iran first entered my consciousness, as it did many Americans’, when U.S. The unthinkable revolution in Iran / Charles Kurzman. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran THE UNTHINKABLE REVOLUTION IN IRAN C H A R L E S H A R V A R D K U R Z M A N U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England Copyright © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America First Harvard University Press paperback edition, 2005 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kurzman, Charles.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |